

"A great deal of what we have said about magic also applies to religion. It is founded on assumptions from beyond the sphere of reason, it uses manual rites and verbal formulae, and the condition of the performer is frequently held to be proper to the success of its appeal. But a number of points for distinction between them have been put forward. As examples we may mention Frazer's formal criteria, which have been widely adopted, of magic being an assertion of man's control over Nature by the commanding power of the spell, and religion as his reliance on spirit powers through the appeal of the prayer. Then there is Malinowski's functional criteria of magic being a simple belief in the definite effects of man's power of using spell and rite, limited in technique and directed to a definite practical end; and religion as a complex set of beliefs and practices, united not in the form of its acts or subject matter, but in the function which it fulfills, self-contained and finding its fulfillment in its very execution. Piddington, again, takes a cross-classification of religion as the ideology of the supernatural, and magic as its application to practical affairs, so that in activities which are ordinarily regarded as essentially religious, there would be on his definition a magical component. Other writers have stressed the difficulty of drawing such a distinction, and prefer to speak of the magico-religious sphere as a whole."

--Raymond Firth

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PRINCIPLES OF DEMOCRACY

It is said that the young people of the United States are not being given adequate training in the values of Americanism. Some people seem to think that to correct this deficiency we should train pupils in the etiquette of the flag, see that they recite the Pledge of Allegiance to it (with mention of a deity added), and censor school libraries and textbooks. Actually, these acts tend to weaken Americanism, according to any definition that might have been given by Thomas Jefferson and other of the country's Fathers. They encourage reverence for symbols to the detriment of the strength of the ideas that are behind the symbols.

Americanism should be defined as a set of social or political principles. Any country can set up blind patriotism as its highest goal, but what has characterized the United States of America is its foundation in principles of individual freedom, the rights of minority groups, and the rule of majorities. Of these, the first and last, at least, practically require each other, and they are opposed to blind patriotism. Other principles can be added, such as national honor.

In what way are individual freedom and political democracy interdependent? When Mr. Green votes for legislative representatives he will want to know the principles on which they will base their votes, and he will therefore need some principles of his own. If he has none of his own, and if he doesn't care, why should he not be as happy living in an autocracy? Actually, it is easy to have at least one principle--that the government allow us to do as we please by preventing others from interfering with us. To implement this principle in a practical way, which necessitates compromise, requires knowledge, because many social matters must be dealt with by restricting one freedom a little in order to protect the most desired ones. But if a Mr. Green is to have understanding of what regulations will be the least restricting and yet do the most good, he will need that knowledge which comes only from free discussion among people who differ widely in attitudes, biases, and other habits of perception. This implies freedom of speech and press and other communication channels, and thus democracy requires at least that much individual freedom. Otherwise it is a farce.

Likewise, freedom of speech generally requires democracy. If Mr. Green lives where his rulers cannot be recalled and replaced or guided by the people, the rulers will sooner or later develop ways of governing that suit themselves, although bringing suffering to others. There are many cases of benevolent autocracy, such as the long rule of the Antonine emperors in the Roman Empire. No doubt there is about

as much consideration for the majority of the people in those situations as in most democracies. Yet history shows that only enlightened rulers seek to prevent revolution by keeping discontent at a minimum--that is, a minimum as to numbers of people--and that there are rather few enlightened rulers in autocracies. In general, the autocrat cares for the opinions of only the most powerful of his subjects and for only that future of his country which will lie within his lifetime.

Democracy could exist without appreciable free speech if the citizen were allowed to vote his choice between two or three puppet candidates, but the value of democracy would be lost. It is believed that this situation has occurred recently, or does occur, in eastern European states. The various gradations of restrictions on free speech that are represented by factions everywhere can be defended only on the premise that certain questions are not ultimately settled by human beings or that certain questions are already settled for all time.

The larger purpose of democracy, as far as political wisdom is concerned, is to insure that no group can ever unite in discontent strong enough to enable them to overturn the social order. The tyrant who keeps his finger on the public pulse enough to know the trends, and who is able to satisfy the groups who feel a growing discontent, can do the job as well, but only until dissatisfaction with being manipulated is itself the root of strong popular discontent. In the long run, educated people with spirit will want to know that they themselves control their own destinies. Furthermore, minorities will want to know that regulations are made with the welfare of all the people in mind, and not just those with power. This implies that minorities will demand defenses against regulations that are acceptable only to majorities. Such a state requires freedom of speech and press, so that all with grievances can make them known without fear, no matter what they are. But free speech tends to unite groups of like attitudes and to give them strength of purpose, and under these circumstances democracy seems inevitable.

As far as it is possible to draw the necessary distinctions and to determine just who was ruling at any given time and place, it seems that history teaches that democracy is no more lasting than autocracy. Ancient Sumeria is thought to have been a democracy, the Greek states were democratic within the social restrictions of the time, and so was early Rome. Jefferson made a point of the fact that populations lose their zeal for the right to be heard, the right to written law, and other rights, as time goes on. Any renewal of this zeal, then, ought to be welcomed by a democratic government, and any signs of political conformity amounting to over ninety percent of the people ought to call for continued examination of the causes of the conformity and its depth. As to depth, it will be seen that the statement by ninety percent of the people that they believe in God is shallow and needs definition. After definition of such words as "believe" and "God", the agreement between believers dwindles considerably. As to causes, it is often apathy or indoctrination. As long as human beings are of different temperaments and must live in different conditions, depending on various occupations, it seems unlikely that there will be many questions on which there is more than ninety percent perceptive agreement.

One sign of deterioration of American democracy is the lack of the will of the leading political parties to oppose one another. An illustration of this is the quotation from Democrat Lyndon Johnson in the Saturday Evening Post for January 24, 1959. Then Senate Majority Leader, in opposition to a Republican President, he said, "We've junked the old Taft practice--that the duty of the opposition is to oppose... I want to make absolutely sure that the Communists don't play one branch of the government against the other, or one party off against the other, as happened in the Korean War." He was talking about foreign policy, and

not domestic affairs, but his attitude seems to be that there can be only one view of our relationship to the rest of the world. Democracy is based on the premise that there are more than one view. If there is disagreement among people about foreign policy, and if foreign policy is to be governed in a democratic way, it is contradictory to ask that anyone will vote or advise or consent as the majority party decides even when he disagrees. Whether or not unity of purpose is an over-riding consideration in our relations with other countries, it is not in accord with the ideal of democracy. In actual war democracy sometimes suffers, apparently of necessity, but whether the international struggle for the balance of power, or other peacetime rivalries or fears, should be made an excuse for conformity of expressed opinion and action is surely a more controversial issue.

Another sign of the deterioration of democracy is the failure to improve it and broaden it to meet new conditions. The record of this country is not bad in this regard. The American Civil Liberties Union was founded in 1920 and is experiencing healthy growth despite attacks of large societies such as the Illinois American Legion. When television developed, a rule granting equal rights to all political parties was established, with more or less success. Newspapers that try to give full coverage to both sides of public issues are very scarce, but a few large-circulation magazines do print articles of opposite view on questions that excite the passions of the man in the street.

It is not difficult to find signs of an irrational demand for conformity that are alarming. I work at an ordnance installation. The U.S. Treasury Department pressures such plants to persuade employees to buy Government bonds on the payroll deduction plan. I have refused since about 1940, having decided at that time that I disagree with the concepts of government financing that underlie bond sales.

In 1961 I was called to the office of the Finance and Accounting Officer and urged to enroll for a bond. My explanations did not even prevent the question, "You do believe in the American Way of Life, don't you?" Later I had to talk with the Controller and his assistant. In 1962 a new finance officer began calling me in two or three times a week to listen to his views on the subject. He had persuaded all in the department to buy, he said, except me, and his aim was to get everybody to buy. My arguments included the idea that when 100% of the American people report agreement on any question, that day will record that the final gasp of democracy has passed. To buy a bond is, among other things, to vote for the financing method it supports, the method of operating on debt, although to fail to buy is not necessarily a vote against it, since there is more than one reason for refusing.

To justify myself for thinking for myself I have only to refer to the definition of democracy and the premises on which it is based. To justify my decision, which should not be necessary, since democracy obviously could not long endure were every citizen required to explain his decisions, I may call attention to the simple doctrine that a government cannot forever borrow more and more money and yet keep its promises to pay it back with interest. A government, unless it is socialistic, is not a business; it does not run on profits. Its only true income is through taxation, using the term in its wide sense, and such charges for cost as are made in the postal system.

What interests me most about the bond controversy is the involvement with democratic ideals. Either a citizen is free to make up his own mind or he is not; either a bond purchase is voluntary or it is not. In a democracy it is taken for granted that some people will be right and others mistaken, although it is also assumed that there is no ultimate knowledge as to which is which. It is assumed that those who are mistaken may be misguided in various ways, that they may be purely foolish,

yet everyone has a right--in a democracy--to be a fool. A nation that lives by written law cannot pressure one to buy bonds or to do anything else until his act is at least legally required. Above all, the argument that one should "join the team" is an argument for tyranny by the majority, and it implies that once a majority on any question has been attained, thereafter democracy ceases to affect it. In fact, autocracy can honor joining the team most logically. How can democracy exist when only one solution of a problem can be voted?

A right that is worth having must be used or it will be lost. When a group of people are made so confused in their thinking that they "join the team" in activity that is opposed to their better judgement, they are not available to defend the right they have given up, and someone should take up the cause for them just to keep the right in effect. Thus, even if I wished to buy government bonds, there would be wisdom in my refusing if I were the only one who still had not acceded, and if I knew that some had unwillingly given up their right. It is a little abstract, but if we are to know what democracy is, we must get abstract. Suppose that I did not even know that there was anyone who would have refused to buy bonds. Then, if I could conceive of any reason for refusing them, would it not be patriotic of me to take the burden of preserving the right upon myself, if necessary, knowing that if I did not it might well be lost?

Democracy is a political system. It rests on theory. Not all mentalities are the type to understand and appreciate the theory, but if it is to be valued there will be some who do understand it. Thus it is that not only should Americans be taught the principles of democracy but also the reason for those principles.

--Harry E. Mongold

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"Of all the systems of religion that ever were invented, there is none more derogatory to the Almighty, more unedifying to man, more repugnant to reason, and more contradictory in itself, than this thing called Christianity. Too absurd for belief, too impossible to convince, and too inconsistent for practice, it renders the heart torpid, or produces only atheists and fanatics. As an engine of power, it serves the purpose of despotism; and as a means of wealth, the avarice of priests; but so far as respects the good of man in general, it leads to nothing here or hereafter." --Thomas Paine, in "The Age of Reason".

"Mass hysteria is a phenomenon not confined to human beings; it may be seen in any gregarious species. I once saw a photograph of a large herd of wild elephants in Central Africa seeing an airplane for the first time, and all in a state of wild collective terror. The elephant, at most times, is a calm and sagacious beast, but this unprecedented phenomenon of a noisy, unknown animal in the sky had thrown the whole herd completely off its balance. Each separate animal was terrified, and its terror communicated itself to the others, causing a vast multiplication of panic. As, however, there were no journalists among them, the terror died down when the airplane was out of sight." --Bertrand Russell, in "To Face Danger Without Hysteria".

"We men of science, at any rate, hold ourselves morally bound to 'try all things and hold fast to that which is good'; and among public benefactors, we reckon him who explodes old error, as next in rank to him who discovers new truth." --T. H. Huxley, in "Life and Letters".

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On "Der Stellvertreter", I'm in agreement with most of your comments, even though I'd agree, too, with those who regret that Pope Pius XII is singled out for condemnation because of a sin of omission which was common to many in responsible positions both within and without the Reich. As you say, there were "thousands of other prominent individuals who likewise ignored the Nazi atrocities". Hochhuth, incidentally, was nine or ten years old when Hitler came to power and was later a member of the Youth Corps. But I don't know if he qualifies thereby as one of the Germans who was "at least peripherally aware of the appalling crimes perpetrated in Hitler's concentration camps". It is difficult to condemn those who were only children, even though they might have eagerly taken part in such activities as the Nazis relegated to the Youth Corps.

The defense of political conservatism by Pepsi Cola (pardon me-- I mean Publicola) is one of the best I've seen, though of course I am biased against his topic and think it inherently indefensible. Politicians, as I pointed out a couple of issues back, ought to be conservative (in the original sense--i.e., cautious), but conservatism as a social creed is something else again. Publicola touches on some of the points which make conservatism of the William F. Buckley variety so unattractive to me, however, and the essay is extremely thought-provoking.

Chay Borsella mentions one characteristic of American conservatives in the letter section, and sure enough Publicola incorporates the characteristic into his presentation. Conservatives tend, as Chay observed, to avidly support the religious establishment (because, I suppose, a powerful church has always been one guarantee of stability--i.e., stagnation); and Pub (if I may become familiar) rings in "the stigma of Original Sin" in his second paragraph, seemingly without realizing how narrow and provincial it makes him sound. Conservatism is traditionally associated with such superstitious hogwash, and that's probably why that political philosophy is moribund in the United States. Another attitude of the arch-conservative which repels me is his love of tradition, per se. I don't want to destroy the Parthenon, the Statue of Liberty, etc., and all they stand for, but the veneration of something merely because it is traditional is absurd. Laws and customs ought to be examined as if they were previously unthought of innovations going into effect next week, and the question asked, "Is this law or custom desirable or necessary, or can we do without it?" If a practice fails to justify itself on its own merits, then the fact that we've been following it for three hundred years adds not one ounce of value to it. Finally, I cannot pass without comment the assertion that "intuition and emotion" make a contribution which is somehow more "human" than that made by reason. Conservatives are generally suspicious of reason, of course, because reason cannot be swayed by appeals to tradition and dramatic declarations (e.g., Publicola's beautiful image of a pyramid of History that is overwhelming and indestructible), but isn't it going a bit far to assert that reason cannot make a "uniquely human" contribution? Indeed, what is more human than the ability to reason? Emotion we share with most of the higher mammals, intuition with infants. But every human contribution, from the plays of Aeschylus to the United Nations, is


LETTERS

pre-eminently a contribution of reason.

Marty Helgesen, in his argument with you re the relative virtues of atheism vis-à-vis Catholicism, reminds me very much of Leonard Kohler, an acquaintance of mine. Both are extremely intelligent men trying to defend the indefensible--and doing rather well, all things considered. Len is that rarest of all souls, the intelligent Protestant anti-evolutionist, and I, being Modern and Enlightened, waste a lot of breath trying to shake his opposition to science. As a matter of fact, the parallel between this (also interminable) argument and your running battle of words with Helgesen extends to the very nature of the exchanges: just as you make embarrassing mistakes when describing Catholic theology, I lack the necessary background in biology to offer more than tentative rebuttal to Len's criticism.

In scorning Evolution-with-a-capital-"E", Len makes use of what I suppose are standard arguments (such as the fact that common, non-domesticated animals haven't done much evolving in the four or five thousand years that man has been painting or carving images of them), but his main objection to evolution is that, in his words, it substitutes sleight-of-hand for divine guidance. According to Len, Darwin invented a substitute God, claimed that it generated variation in life-forms, and called it "natural selection"; and unless you happen not to believe in a personalized deity, this is a needless complication. In other words, Len objects to replacing a mysterious theological concept with an equally mysterious biological one, when the former explains the development of life well enough and the latter doesn't clarify but merely confuses further. (If your brief summary of his views is an accurate representation of his actual attitude, then I would say that Leonard Kohler is typical of opponents of evolution, in that he plainly does not understand the system he challenges. The fact that common species have undergone no substantial change in the few thousand years that man has been accurately recording the appearance of his fellow creatures is utterly meaningless. The most obvious objection to drawing conclusions from this observation is that the amount of time which has passed since a man first attempted a realistic likeness of (to use a common example) a lion is, though vast in human terms, insignificant in the frame of reference one must accept in dealing with the previous history of life on earth. A less obvious but equally important objection to rejecting the theory of evolution on the basis of the stability of certain species over a limited period of time is that a species changes rapidly (in geological terms) and radically only when this change is necessary to adjust to environmental pressure; so long as its environment remains reasonably stable, there is no reason to expect an animal, having previously adapted to that environment, to change significantly. After all, the oyster hasn't changed perceptibly in 200,000,000 years or more, but this in no way comprises a legitimate argument against evolution. Mr. Kohler's general remarks on natural selection deserve a thoughtful reply, though again I must observe that his understanding of evolution is discouragingly superficial. Charles Darwin did not "invent" natural selection as an alternate deity, nor did he claim for it the omnipotence that Len apparently believes is attributed to the process by evolutionists. Darwin

DISSENTING OPINIONS



was the first man to understand and explain natural selection (albeit inadequately--for the knowledge of genetics which is essential to complete comprehension of the more subtle aspects of evolutionary theory was unavailable to him), but it is in no sense an "invention" of his--the process had been occurring since the origin of life on earth, and Charles Darwin's claim to fame is that he described it in detail and framed certain broad principles which were operative in evolution. And natural selection most emphatically does not "generate" variation; if modern evolutionists made that claim, I should agree with Leonard that the theory of evolution was an unnecessary complication on the theme of divine guidance. Rather, natural selection makes use of variations which already exist (the term implies selection between existing characteristics), causing a "useful" variation to become prevalent throughout an entire species. Evolutionary theory begins with the proposition that there is a great deal of variation among the individual members of a given species. This expected variation (incorporating both "normal" variation and less common radical variation--i.e., mutation) is the raw material on which natural selection operates. The Inequality Axiom states that whenever two living creatures are at all distinguishable (i.e., into separate species, or distinct sub-types within a single species), one must possess an adaptive advantage--must, in other words, be "superior" to the other in the context of the particular environment which both seek to inhabit. Thus, the Competitive Exclusion Principle dictates that whenever two species are competing for the resources of the same environmental niche or two distinct sub-types are competing for dominance within a single species, one must eventually totally replace the other. These two principles explain why natural selection operates, and having digested that background information, it is not difficult to grasp the explanation of the process. Essentially, natural selection is differential reproduction: the better-adapted (superior) species or type eventually replaces the less well adapted (inferior) one because the individual members of the first group will, on the average, live longer, acquire more and better food, and hence produce more offspring than the individual members of the second group--and these numerous offspring will inherit the advantage, since the trait which made their parents "superior" is hereditary. This process is painfully slow, but of course the time-scale on which evolution operates is immense. The way in which natural selection (differential reproduction) operates on variations within a species to evolve that species into something distinctly different could be illustrated by reference to countless actual instances, but it is more convenient to set up a hypothetical situation. Suppose that a mutation occurs in one strain of North American rabbits (Mutation A) which causes members of that strain to be somewhat more alert and a trifle speedier than the normal rabbit (Norm B). Suppose, in addition, that all of the genes responsible for this improvement are dominant alleles, and remember that it makes no difference how minor the advantage may be. Mutation A will, statistically, have a better chance than Norm B to live to a ripe old age (for a rabbit) and will produce a greater number of offspring--and since the genetic factors causing the adaptive advantage of Mutation A are dominant, the progeny will possess a similar advantage over their contemporaries. Granting this, it is not difficult to perceive that, no matter how slight the original advantage, Mutation A, if given sufficient time, will replace Norm B as the dominant type within the species. Mutation A then becomes the normal type, another adaptive variation arises, and the entire process begins again. It is a process which, far from being the artificial imposition of a few eccentric biologists or anyone's "invention", is the inevitable corollary of life-as-we-know-it. It is still possible to envision a Supreme Being behind this concept, but no one who fairly ex-

amines the evidence can doubt that evolution does, in fact, occur.))

A. G. Smith's snide reference to my military record would be insulting if made by anyone whom I could respect enough to dislike. Actually, I have no military record because none of the armed services are sufficiently desperate to accept a man with diabetes, but I won't let myself off that easily. If I were healthy enough to serve, I'd refuse and go to prison instead. In Mr. Smith's eyes, this doubtless makes me a coward and a traitor. I won't reciprocate by asking Mr. Smith to recite his military record, because such a tactic is not acceptable in anything that pretends to be a reasonable discussion--and also because I suspect that he has a very good military record. Many of his remarks regarding the way in which this country ought to deal with the rest of the world smack of fanatic militarism of the variety espoused by, among others, the late General Patton, and I'm sure that A. G. wouldn't mind killing "Gooks" and other representatives of "inferior races".

"The equality which the friends of democracy seek to establish for the multitude is not only just but likewise expedient between equals. Hence, if the governing class are numerous, many democratic institutions are useful; as, for example, the restriction of the tenure of office to six months, so that all those who are of equal station may share in them. Indeed, equals or peers, whenever they are numerous, become a kind of democracy, and therefore demagogues are very likely to arise among them, as I have already remarked. A short tenure of office prevents oligarchies and aristocracies from falling into the hands of families. It is not easy for a person to do any great harm when his tenure of office is short, whereas long possession begets tyranny in oligarchies and democracies. For the aspirants to tyranny are either the principal men of the state, who in democracies are demagogues and in oligarchies members of ruling houses, or those who hold great offices and have a long tenure of them." --Aristotle, in "Politics".

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Re "The Deputy": Doesn't the Roman Catholic Church have a long history of staying out of political affairs when the situation becomes too hot to handle? As long as times are good and the Church can acquire its revenues and exert some influence on government, it will be involved in politics. But let a Napoleon or Hitler come onto the scene and the Church recedes from the sphere of active politics and retreats to the Vatican or its various other strongholds. If you think some of those medieval monasteries look as if they could hold out against an army, it's only because that was precisely what their walls were built for; in some cases they have been used as fortresses. The policy of the Roman Catholic Church is now somewhat more subtle, but the general idea is the same. In my opinion, the Catholic Church is the biggest goddamn business on earth.

You raise a point in discussing "The Deputy" which has particular relevance to me at this time. I'm being drafted in early May, and submitting to the draft is a gesture of pure cowardice on my part, as I am unalterably opposed to conscription for any purpose. Slavery is slavery no matter what name you attach to it, and willingly submitting to slavery is equivalent to condoning it. As you say, we give tacit consent to an evil when we know that it is being committed and do nothing to interfere. But I see no reason to sacrifice myself needlessly for a cause that can be won without my going to prison. I will vote against the draft when it is finally put to a vote, as President Johnson's investigation and the current rise of anti-conscription opinion indicate

that it will, and I see no reason to lose my right to vote entirely by standing in opposition.

I am not, by the way, opposed to either military service or war, but only to the draft. I do not feel that I can object to wars being fought unless I can also say how to prevent them. And if people feel that a particular war is sufficiently justified to volunteer to fight in it, that's fine with me; if I felt it was to my advantage to fight in one, I'd enlist.

Will Bill Donaho's actions exclude him from contact with other science fiction readers? I do not accept the proposition that someone can be kicked out of science fiction fandom, the group being far too loosely bound and informal for that to happen, but Donaho is rapidly alienating himself from most members of the fraternity because he is an extremely dangerous individual to have around. On a strictly individual level, I am going to have nothing further to do with him (either in person or by mail) and I urge others to follow suite. I wouldn't want Donaho as a guest in my apartment because he might later decide to launch a crusade against someone else who was there and cite incidents that occurred or allegedly occurred in my home as evidence. He has reprinted letters sent to him with explicit instructions to the contrary and has misquoted letters dealing with this case as well, so I don't want him as a correspondent. He has turned various amateur publications over to the police, so I would hesitate to send him mine--I doubt that any of my publications have violated the law or will do so in the future, but I dislike the idea of having my name come to the attention of the police even if it is cleared. Likewise, if I were an official of a science fiction convention I wouldn't want Donaho to attend because he might cause the police to come and investigate some imaginary offense, thus causing the attendees both inconvenience and damaged reputations.

"The fiercest fanatics are often selfish people who were forced, by innate shortcomings or external circumstances, to lose faith in their own selves. They separate the excellent instrument of their selfishness from their ineffectual selves and attach it to the service of some holy cause. And though it be a faith of love and humility they adopt, they can be neither loving nor humble." --Eric Hoffer, in "The True Believer".

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You remark that, "The purpose of law in a rational society is to preserve order and to deter individuals from engaging in acts or practices generally disapproved by the majority of their fellow citizens." This is not strictly true, and I think you will have no objection to a slight amendment to your statement by substituting "harmful to" for "generally disapproved by the majority of". You don't approve of A. G. Smith's remarks, but you wouldn't want to pass a law against his making them.

You made a serious error in drawing the distinction between psychological and physical addiction to narcotics. Most physical addiction occurs not as a result of the use of opiates for medical reasons, but from their use for "kicks". Eventually the kick wears off, but if the drug user tries to stop taking it, he finds that he suffers physiological withdrawal symptoms. This is physical addiction, resulting from voluntary use of opiates. Very few users intend to become addicted when they start; they just find that they can't stop, and since they are usually rather neurotic in the first place, they haven't the (quite con-

CONTINUED AFTER "JOTTINGS"

ted pauls

IRRATIONALITY IN FOREIGN POLICY: Predictably, Senator J. William Fulbright's recent crushing indictment of myths in United States foreign policy generated an immediate and intense reaction, running the gamut from cautious agreement and the guarded admission that a reconsideration of certain aspects of this nation's foreign policy was advisable to the zealous condemnation of Senator Fulbright by the ever-alert legion of super-patriots, spokesmen for whom charged that the legislator was an appeaser eager to acquiesce to the demands of the international Communist conspiracy. The most encouraging response, however, originated with those commentators who, while assuring the more nervous and excitable citizens of this republic that they did not necessarily accept the validity of Senator Fulbright's specific recommendations, agreed that the subject was at least deserving of further consideration and that the controversy which has been generated constitutes a healthy sign of national interest in foreign affairs. In the spirit of this atmosphere of controversy, I should like to offer some additional comments in this periodical concerning my own views with respect to the faults incorporated into American foreign policy and the manner in which it can be improved and rendered more effective. These remarks, I am certain, will not succeed in generating the same degree of controversy even within the limited circle of Kipple's readers that Senator Fulbright's observations inspired, if only because my basic views are already quite well-known and the loyal opposition, ably captained by Derek Nelson, has been submitting them to painfully minute inspection for the past several years.

At the outset of these remarks, a general observation might be in order. Derek Nelson, in several of his most recent letters to this publication, has advanced the proposition that rational self-interest should be the legitimate motivation of United States foreign

JOTTINGS FROM THE EDITOR'S DESK

policy, and his apparent desire to especially stress the point leads to the conclusion that Derek is under the misapprehension that I reject this principle. Of course, such is most certainly not the case, as I have endeavored to point out often in the past. It is true that, on occasion, I have advanced the proposition that the interests of the world as a whole should be given precedence over the national interests of any particular portion of the globe, and I am willing to defend this doctrine. But the distinction between these two ostensibly different concepts is purely academic. It seems perfectly clear to me that the interests of the United States and the interests of the peoples of the world are not significantly different at this juncture in history. I believe this not because I am blindly chauvinistic, but because so long as the United States is both a free nation and a major world power, the interests of this country must--of necessity--parallel the broad interests of the entire

world, not only on the level of ideology but also on a purely pragmatic level--for so long as this country is engaged in an ideological struggle with Communism, it would most assuredly not be in our interest to antagonize a substantial bloc of non-Communist countries. Where I suspect that Derek Nelson and I most radically disagree is simply in deciding precisely what constitutes our national interest. Since a full-scale war (invariably culminating in a nuclear exchange) would involve the destruction of the United States as a nation, as well as the annihilation of other participating countries and a number of innocent bystanders, I submit that in the final analysis world peace must constitute the principal goal of United States foreign policy; for surely it is consonant with an avowed policy of rational self-interest to continue to survive. To pursue, as many conservatives apparently prefer, a course of action which promises the fulfillment of an immediate goal consistent with our self-interest (say, the military conquest of Cuba) while ignoring the ultimate consequences of our action in terms of the over-all goal is patently ridiculous; such a short-sighted policy would be tantamount to national suicide. We must recognize that our national interests may best be served--indeed, may only be served--by achieving a lasting peace between nations supporting a nuclear capability, and therefore our foreign policy should at all times be conducted in a manner suited to the attainment of this admirable end.

Let us now examine a few of the more questionable aspects of the foreign policy of this nation, underlying assumptions which Senator Fulbright so aptly termed "myths". One of the most tenacious of these myths is that of American omnipotence, the assumption that the United States is by such an overwhelming margin the most powerful and influential nation on earth that it can casually dictate policy to the entire planet. The view which holds that the Soviet Union is an overtly warlike nation, preparing the imminent invasion of Western Europe and attempting to achieve parity in nuclear capability with the United States as a prelude to unleashing World War III, would also certainly qualify in the category of myths which are incorporated into the foreign policy of this nation. Others include the related views that Communism is an extra-national, monolithic (to use the cliché term) entity, and that in a Communist society, the interests of the national power are subverted to the ideological interests of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine; and the position, which remains popular in many quarters, that negotiation--without regard to the specific details being negotiated--is inherently dangerous and therefore something to be avoided whenever possible, while national prestige, rather than practical and material considerations, should govern diplomatic activity. All of these myths are to one degree or another root assumptions of United States foreign policy, and to the extent that they are defective or incomplete these fundamental attitudes will generate practical policies which are not applicable to the situation with which they have been created to deal and will as a result be useless or even dangerous.

The initial myth is perhaps the most misleading and dangerous of all. It is redundant to point out that the United States is no longer capable of single-handedly dominating the stage of international politics. This nation was virtually omnipotent in the years immediately following the successful conclusion of World War II, both militarily (by virtue of possessing a monopoly on atomic weapons and also possessing conventional military forces which had grown throughout the duration of the war rather than gradually diminishing as in the case of the prostrate nations of Eastern and Western Europe) and economically. Obviously, this pleasant situation could not be expected to endure indefinitely. The distribution of power in all its manifestations has undergone significant revision in the intervening period, and while responsible

American leaders today consciously acknowledge the fact that the military and economic power of the nation, though still considerable, is no longer necessarily decisive, it is an axiom of human psychology that individuals often continue to base their actions on principles which they have consciously repudiated. Certain aspects of United States foreign policy continue to be based on the now-fallacious assumption that this country is decisively and unchallengeably the single greatest power on earth rather than simply one of two enormously powerful nations. The Cuban trade boycott comes to mind immediately as a prominent example of a specific policy founded on the fallacy (or "myth", as Senator Fulbright would call it) of American omnipotence. The failure of the boycott to effectively achieve its goal, due to the unwillingness of our allies to sacrifice what they envision as valuable commercial advantages in order to promote an obstinate and, in their view, largely unnecessary attempt to isolate a minor Communist state, has repeatedly resulted in the humiliation of the United States. This policy had, either consciously or unconsciously, been founded on the assumption of American omnipotence--i.e., it was felt that when this country announced the imposition of an economic boycott against Cuba all of its allies would immediately consent to sacrifice their immediate economic interests in order to contribute to the furtherance of United States political interests. Even our most devoted associates refused to make what to them appeared to be a nonsensical sacrifice, of course, and our stubborn adherence to the moribund policy of economic strangulation merely serves to make the United States appear foolish and impotent in the eyes of the world.

The second myth with which this essay is concerned shares with the first the dubious justification of having been accurate at one time although rendered obsolete by the passage of years. The Cold War policy of the United States and its Western European allies has been founded on the assumption that the Soviet Union is a belligerent, expansionist state, dedicated to the armed subjugation of the West and unmindful of the consequences--that, in other words, Soviet Russia intends to deliberately initiate a third world war whenever the moment appears opportune. This supposition was the raison d'être for NATO and other military alliances entered into by the United States after the conclusion of World War II, and in many circles it is to this day frowned upon to doubt the validity of this fundamental assumption. Apparently, the most enthusiastic supporters of this viewpoint picture in some dark recess of their minds the terrifying spectacle of hundreds of thousands of Soviet troops amassed on the borders of Eastern Europe and prepared to lunge across and subjugate Western civilization at any moment. Those who dare to voice doubt or otherwise criticize this myth are vehemently assailed by the reactionary wing of American politics and branded as traitors and cowards; surely, observes the super-patriot, it is unwise to place any faith in Nikita Khrushchev's sincerity when he pleads that the Soviet Union is desirous of peace. The only sufficient reply to this not-entirely-relevant remark is that it is certainly foolish to contend that a statement must necessarily be untrue because it was uttered by a Communist. If Premier Khrushchev should claim in one of his verbose public addresses that the world is approximately round, I am fully prepared to accept this statement as valid; similarly, when he claims that the Soviet Union desires peace (i.e., that Russia desires continued existence) I am equally prepared to acknowledge the probable veracity of this declaration--because the alternative is in both instances manifestly absurd.

When nuclear weapons have become sufficiently sophisticated so that thermonuclear war necessarily entails the destruction of the participating nations (as well as that of many non-participants), it is ri-

diculous to accept the contention that any nation intends deliberately to instigate or provoke such a war. Obviously, the Soviet Union is desirous of peace--for the very simple and uncomplicated reason that it cannot hope to survive a modern war should one erupt. It does not follow from this premise that the Russian Communist leaders are going to conduct themselves in an amiable, cooperative fashion; on the contrary, they will probably continue to act as they have always acted. The Russians will be ruthless, intransigent, opportunistic ideological opponents. They will attempt wherever possible to undermine the power and prestige of the United States, they will seek in future negotiations to achieve Western concessions by any possible expedient, they will play at the game of brinkmanship (a modern variety of Russian roulette played with missiles); they will fume and rage, curse and bicker, instigate subversive activities in other countries and engineer cunning diplomatic pitfalls for the West. But the Soviet Union will not deliberately initiate or provoke a thermonuclear war. Their motive for desiring continued peace is nothing so tenuous as humanitarianism or an ideological commitment to peaceful co-existence, but rather the far more fundamental and binding motive of survival, the quite normal disinclination of a nation to commit suicide.

The current relaxation of international tensions and the consequent decrease in the likelihood of nuclear warfare in the immediate future is the result of a realization by the United States that the desire for peaceful co-existence professed by the Russians is not only genuine but, given their circumstances, inevitable; and a simultaneous realization by the Soviet Union that the United States is prevented from deliberately initiating a thermonuclear war by precisely the same consideration (viz., survival). It may appear strange to many Americans that the Russian leaders felt such an assurance to be necessary--after all, aren't we obviously a peace-loving, friendly society which would never, never strike the first blow in a nuclear exchange?--but this is merely another indication that most American citizens and a frightening number of American policy-makers possess no true comprehension of the position of the two super-powers in the Cold War. The Soviet Union has traditionally feared, genuinely and sincerely, aggression on the part of the capitalist West. Whether or not this apprehensive attitude was justified is of no concern to this treatise, but we must not ignore its existence or discount its tremendous effect on Soviet policy. The American myth depicting the Russians as bellicose fanatics preparing the imminent invasion of Western territory has been mirrored throughout the history of the Cold War by the equally irrational Soviet myth which assumed that the Western powers were awaiting a convenient opportunity to launch an invasion of Russia. However sincere our advocacy of peace may have been, the naturally skeptical Russian leaders could never accept our protestations that we were not contemplating aggression; they felt that they could not afford to trust us, just as we believe we cannot afford to trust them. Only when the Communists had realized that the United States, as well as the Soviet Union, had everything to lose and nothing to gain should a thermonuclear war erupt could our lofty statements and flowery speeches in support of peaceful relations begin to possess credibility for the Russians. At present, both nations have discovered a rather startling fact which, quite apart from our warm, friendly, peace-loving nature and the ruthless, cold, aggressive nature which we attribute to the Russians (and vice versa, of course), prevents either of them from deliberately provoking a world war: viz., that neither could hope to survive such an exchange.

I do not wish to underestimate the danger of nuclear warfare occurring, a danger which remains grave despite recent improvement. A nuclear exchange may result from a crisis in which both power-blocs feel

their interests sufficiently threatened that neither retreats from the ultimate confrontation; a nuclear holocaust could also result from a minor military clash which, contrary to the actual desires of all of the participants, escalates into a general war between two major power-blocs; or nuclear war could be touched off as the result of mechanical or human error. But the point I wish to stress is that neither important nuclear power would deliberately and with malice aforethought initiate a war (as, e.g., the Japanese did when they attacked Pearl Harbor); such a course of action is not compatible with the continued survival of either nation.

The remaining myths may be dealt with more concisely. The cliché term "monolithic" which in the past had often been utilized to describe Communism has been decisively discredited by the schism between the Soviet Union and Communist China, but United States foreign policy has so far failed to adequately adjust to what is commonly conceived as a new situation. Actually, the overt conflict between the two Communist giants differs largely in degree from the previous state of affairs; covert conflict has always existed between the various Communist nations, just as it has traditionally existed between most non-Communist nations with divergent national interests. The concept of "monolithic international Communism" was simply one aspect of a much broader erroneous assumption on which our specific policies have been founded--viz., that Communist nations invariably place the cause of a world Communist revolution above their petty national interests. This conception has never really been valid, and the fratricidal quarrel between the Soviet Union and the Peoples Republic of China merely serves to conclusively illustrate the untenability of the assumption. As Charles de Gaulle, perhaps alone among contemporary Western leaders, understands, national interests are never subverted to the dictates of political or military alliances, racial bonds, religious affinity, or (as in the case of the Soviet Union and Communist China) ideological ties. With certain extremely rare exceptions which serve only to prove the rule, no nation has ever sacrificed what its leaders felt to be its national interest in order to preserve other interests; extra-national interests are always subsidiary. The Christian nations of Europe, for example, continued to quarrel among themselves and conduct wars to satisfy national honor and support national claims, even when faced over a prolonged period with the imminent invasion from the East of menacing hordes of heathens. The same process operates today with respect to the Communist movement: ideological bonds are only effective in maintaining harmony when no significant national interests are at stake.

Finally, this modest investigation of myths in United States foreign policy would not be complete without an examination of the unique and remarkable attitude toward negotiation which one encounters in this country. The pathetic failure of Neville Chamberlain is often cited by vehement super-patriots as an indication that there is something inherently debilitating and cowardly (and therefore dangerous) about negotiating differences between nations. Actually, of course, it was not the inclination to negotiate which led Mr. Chamberlain to grief, but rather his ineptitude as a negotiator. Interdicting the concept of negotiated settlements as a result of Chamberlain's deplorable surrender to Hitler at Munich is utterly foolish; it is analogous to condemning the process of constitutional democracy because occasionally a scoundrel is elected to public office. My own view tends to the opposite extreme--as I have previously stated in this periodical, my preference for a national attitude toward negotiation would be one of willingness to negotiate any issue at any time. This is not to be interpreted as a blanket promise to make concessions, but merely as a commitment to discuss the various possibilities of any specific situation without having limited the range

of negotiation beforehand. One would not at first glance think that this policy could be objectionable to any significant faction in the political arena, but many individuals owing allegiance to the right wing of American politics have very strenuously objected to such a position, and the protestations of this influential minority, combined with the lack of enthusiasm for negotiation which characterizes the American, have colored many aspects of this nation's foreign policy. The reader will recall that a reconciliation with Panama nearly foundered as a result of United States objections to the wording of a tentative agreement which pledged this country to renegotiate the treaty governing ownership of the Panama Canal and sovereignty in the Canal Zone. I must confess that this objection seemed at the time and still seems trivial. A commitment to renegotiate the provisions of the Panama-United States treaty was not equivalent to a pledge by this country to accept terms more favorable to Panama; it was simply an agreement to discuss the possibilities and indorse some sort of new treaty to supercede the currently operative one. Had our negotiators wished to do so, they could have insisted on a new treaty incorporating terms even more favorable to the United States--though this would have been neither admirable nor realistic, it would have been perfectly consistent with a promise to renegotiate the treaty. But the United States interpreted such a pledge as a promise to grant important concessions, and on this absurdity relations between the two countries nearly came to grief.

This underlying attitude is inextricably connected to a second attitude toward negotiation which is characteristic of the United States. We Americans are an inordinately proud people and look upon the granting of any concession to a political opponent or potential enemy as an unacceptable injury to national prestige. This nation is still a relative novice in the game of international diplomacy, and has yet to fully comprehend the unimportance of national prestige as a consideration in diplomatic exchange. Concessions desired by another country should always be judged in terms of their practical consequences; although prestige may be a consideration, it must never be permitted to become the over-riding factor. This truism of effective diplomacy is well understood by the Russians--the classic illustration being the Hitler-Stalin Pact, which immensely damaged the prestige of the Soviet Union as well as that of international Communism but provided practical advantages which the Soviet diplomats considered essential--but the United States has not yet learned to accept this principle. This disinclination to grant concessions where there is no practical objection to them has led this nation to pursue narrow, unproductive policies in many areas of the world, maintained simply by obstinacy. Thus, we have consistently refused to recognize the Oder-Neisse Line, which forms the boundary between Poland and the German Democratic Republic. Originally, this policy possessed a practical justification: the reunification of Germany as a Western-oriented republic was envisioned, and therefore no responsible Western spokesman wished to recognize a border which ceded previously German territory to Communist Poland. However, reunification of Germany as a pro-Western power is now acknowledged to be little more than a pleasant dream even among the eternally optimistic diplomats of the West German Foreign Office. This fact neatly demolishes the practical justification for the refusal by the West to recognize the de facto boundary between East Germany and Poland, for it could not conceivably be of concern to the Western powers where the border between two Communist countries is located. The West neither gains nor loses territory or any other material quantity when such a boundary is relocated; were Poland to suddenly claim that its territory extended on the Northeast into the middle of Siberia, this could not possibly be of interest to the United States. But the policy, having been evolved for sound practical reasons,

is maintained as a matter of prestige. This example could be multiplied by citing many other areas in which useless and unrealistic policies are maintained solely as a matter of "prestige".

The reason that defective root assumption continue to serve as foundations for specific foreign policy positions is that United States foreign policy is a static rather than dynamic device. The situation in the international political arena is constantly shifting, and therefore any policy which hopes to cope with sudden emergencies caused by rapid changes in the positions of other nations must, above all, be flexible. This does not merely mean that we should, as Secretary of State Dean Rusk recently remarked, pursue a separate policy for each individual nation; it also means that our policy should be capable of changing from one day to the next in order to accommodate the shifts which take place in the social and political situations of other sovereign nations and the composition of alliances. A policy which was perfectly appropriate and therefore effective six months ago may be highly inappropriate today and completely disastrous (or, on the other hand, once again appropriate) six months hence. Specific examples have been discussed at considerable length in Kipple #52 and hardly need repeating at this time. What must be realized is simply that foreign policy cannot be effectively conducted on the basis of emotion (as in regard to Cuba or Communist China) or a refusal to recognize the status quo (Germany), nor can automatic responses be permitted to develop which fail to adjust to changing conditions. These symptoms, all of which are present in American foreign policy to one degree or another, are signposts on the road to disaster.

LET FREEDOM REIGN: Recently, the otherwise unexceptional community of East Williston, New York, was thrust into national prominence when the local high school experienced a mild student rebellion. A numerically insignificant segment of the Wheatley High School student body defied duly constituted authority by refusing to recite the pledge of allegiance to the flag, an oath which has comprised the most important element of the opening exercises of New York schools since prayer recitation was banned as unconstitutional. This mere handful of conscientious objectors provoked a controversy far out of proportion to the rather innocuous offense against the American Way of Life with which they are charged. Ever alert to the internal threat to freedom which exists in this nation, the New York branch of the American Legion entered the dispute with characteristic gusto, decrying the appalling lack of patriotism displayed by the youngsters of this era and demanding that the offenders in this particular instance be summarily expelled from school. The state commander of the Legion, J. Arthur Petty, termed the conduct of the twenty dissenting students "outrageous", and under the auspices of the American Legion a general campaign against un-Americanism has been undertaken. Apparently, no one has bothered to inform the governing body of the Legion that conducting a repressive campaign against youthful dissenters is hopelessly un-American in itself--nor is it likely that such a reminder would have been particularly useful.

The refusal by these unusually perceptive students to conform to a traditional observance and recite the pledge of allegiance was apparently a spontaneous act of civil disobedience, undertaken without prior discussion between the participants, and the reasons advanced by the individual protestants were widely divergent. Several students expressed the belief that such compulsory morning exercises violated the First Amendment to the Constitution, and one youngster declared that he "would not salute any flag until (he) can salute one that will fly over the entire world". Certainly there is ample justification for a refusal to participate in such ceremonies. Anyone who seriously considers the pros-

pect of swearing an oath of fealty must at length conclude that the current pledge of allegiance is at least in part objectionable. For some, the comparatively recent inclusion of the phrase "under God" in the pledge would prevent them from reciting it, a reservation which is certainly understandable. My own objections to this pious little chant are based on slightly different ethical considerations, involving the undesirability of an individual swearing to something which is blatantly untrue. Perhaps there will arrive a day when I can, in good conscience, recite the pledge, but that day is not yet. "Liberty and justice for all", the operative phrase of the final line of the pledge of allegiance, remains a lofty ideal which is approached only imperfectly in most areas of this country, and I cannot honestly affirm that the United States flag represents liberty and justice for all until that flag and that ideal dominate Alabama and every other recalcitrant section of the country.

The legal situation is obscured by several highly ambiguous court decisions, but it does not appear probable that "opening exercises", incorporating the pledge of allegiance and required by state law, are unconstitutional, as was claimed by several of the protesting high school students. The decisions of the Supreme Court in West Virginia State Board of Education vs. Barnette and Murray vs. Curlett may indicate a tendency in this direction, but I nevertheless strongly doubt that there can be any constitutional reservation against forcing students who profess no religious precepts to the contrary to parrot an insipid oath--though there no doubt should be. As for the school authorities, their position is clear-cut: the pledge of allegiance is a symbol of American freedom, so they have decreed, apparently without noticing the paradox, that its daily recitation be compulsory. One can easily imagine the scene when this unquestionably patriotic innovation was announced. A jovial, corpulent member of the East Williston School Board addresses an attentive assemblage of students thusly: "Young ladies and gentlemen, the superintendent has reached the conclusion that since the pledge of allegiance to the flag represents a symbol of the immense freedom enjoyed by citizens of this country, you will henceforth recite it every morning whether you like it or not."

O tempora! O mores!

THE DOUBLE STANDARD: In Kipple #57, your obedient servant denounced, with characteristic vigor, the sordid activities of the council of inquisitors which is presently engaged in the task of systematically destroying Walter Breen and Marion Bradley. It has been brought to my attention during the intervening period that my characterization of this venomous crusade as a "vendetta" may have been a trifle hasty. It is true, after all, that the Committee of Public Safety (otherwise known as the Pacificon Committee) has repeatedly denied animosity toward the unfortunate victims, stressing that the interest of the Committee is solely to protect the World Science Fiction Convention from deleterious publicity and legal entanglements. Since I am, after all, a relative outsider (the major developments in this dispute having taken place several thousand miles from Baltimore), it has been pointed out that I really have no right to assume, merely on the basis of their unrestrained viciousness, that the attacks on Walt's character are the result of prior malice. Desiring above all to be fair and just in this dispute, I have consequently re-examined my previous remarks in order to determine whether I had not over-stated my case in my zeal to defend two friends.

After reconsidering at some length all of the evidence which has come into my possession, I have indeed been forced to the opposite conclusion: viz., that my remarks were somehow too equivocal. In perusing

the article entitled "The Breen Affair", I am repelled by the remote tone of the comments--a tone more suited to defending an abstract philosophical concept than to dealing with an odious assault on the character of two of my favorite people. There were extenuating circumstances which I may plead as a partial excuse for the fact that my very genuine concern was translated into indifference when my thoughts were transcribed into typewritten characters. The pompous and stodgy quality of my writing was considerably amplified by repeated editing, a process which I believed necessary under the circumstances. According to John and Bjo Trimble (see The Loyal Opposition), William L. Donaho has threatened to institute legal action against any individual who openly criticizes his methods. Realizing that anyone capable of authoring the pernicious attacks which bear Mr. Donaho's signature would be equally capable of attempting to muzzle opposition by recourse to lawsuits, I determined to avoid this irritation by exercising extreme caution in relating my opinion of the entire affair. Repeatedly editing "The Breen Affair" in an effort to remove any statements which could be construed as actionable had the effect of magnifying the detachment, the lack of feeling which characterizes most of my writing, but the necessity of such precautions is manifest in dealing with a situation of this sort, and the present article will be subjected to the same rigorous editing; with--no doubt--the same result. This word of explanation will, I hope, reassure Walt and Marion that the tone of icy indifference which crept into "The Breen Affair" was an unfortunate byproduct of my attempt to remain within the limits of legality and not an accurate representation of my personal feelings.

Having disposed of that digression, I should like to address myself to the central thesis of this article--i.e., the assertion by the Pacificon Committee that their motive for excluding Walt Breen from the convention which will take place in September was entirely selfless and impersonal. I am placed at a slight disadvantage in considering this question, since, as I say, the significant developments in the case occurred several thousand miles away and have reached me only in the form of printed summaries. However, the theoretical basis on which the Committee has attempted to justify its actions is clear enough, even if some of the specific details of this affair are obscured by distance and the reticence of the principals involved. The convention committee, composed of William L. Donaho, Alva Rogers, J. Ben Stark and Al Halevy, claims the right to exclude from the forthcoming World Science Fiction Convention an individual whose personality displeases them. The Committee--and especially member Donaho--has advanced the accusation that this individual, Walter Breen, is a homosexual who evinces an overt interest in young children. This very serious charge is supported by little concrete evidence but a great deal of innuendo and idle speculation. The Pacificon Committee maintains, however, that the suspicion of homosexuality alone justifies terminating Walt's membership in the forthcoming convention. This exclusion was represented as an unpalatable measure reluctantly undertaken by the Committee solely for the protection of Walt Breen's fellow convention members. Needless to say, this conglomerous body of (presumably) interested spectators was not consulted prior to the action which resulted in Walt's loss of membership; they were presented with a fait accompli, a Committee action imposed by fiat and without consultation with the subscribers whose money will finance the convention. Furthermore, Mr. Donaho, displaying a truly appalling degree of presumptuousness, decided that Walt must be ridden out of science fiction fandom on a rail, as it were. Again, Walter's fellow members were not consulted; the Patriarch of the Church of the Brotherhood of the Way merely issued the excommunication decree (no doubt accompanied by a clap of thunder) on his own authority.

It is alleged that the action of the Committee was necessary in order to protect the interests of the convention members, since Walter Breen's presence at the Pacificon could conceivably have resulted in legal difficulties and highly unfavorable publicity. The ethical standard which dictates that an organization possesses the right to disavow controversial members whose words or deeds might damage the public image of the entire group is a valid one in certain cases, albeit one which I do not personally embrace. In our society, this standard is most firmly entrenched in the mass media--especially television, which often goes to extreme lengths to avoid offending anyone and hence dirtying the public image of a sponsor. It is a most inappropriate standard to be advocated by a group of science fiction readers, who as a body consider themselves broad-minded, highly sophisticated iconoclasts. And it remains valid--if at all--only so long as the standard of judgement is applied in a non-discriminatory fashion. In the present frame of reference, non-discriminatory application of this criterion would dictate the exclusion from the Pacificon of any individual whose presence could, by the standards of society as a whole, damage the membership at large. Anyone who has had extensive contact with science fiction fans must realize, however, that applying the standard in such a fashion would be virtually impossible; fully one half of the individuals who could reasonably be expected to attend the convention might be considered "undesirable" members of the Pacificon by the criteria introduced when Walt Breen was expelled. (It would, for example, be necessary to exclude from the convention those debauchees who boast loudly of their prowess in discovering young women eager to share a bed for the weekend; after all, we must not ignore the possibility that Mary Jane Doe, a naive, teenage science fiction reader from Detroit, could become pregnant as the result of such a liaison.)

The probability of legal entanglements resulting from the activities of an "undesirable" individual at the convention is virtually nil, despite the fact that the self-appointed Council of Moral Judgment active in this case is waving it like a red flag; the important consideration is that of the possibility of detrimental public attention focused on the fraternity of science fiction readers as a result of convention scandals. It is certainly true that if an active homosexual were to pursue his rather odd sexual preferences at the Pacificon extremely deleterious publicity for the entirety of science fiction fandom could easily result. But there are at least a dozen equally appalling possibilities (the pregnancy of a young attendee, mentioned above, is one; a scandal growing out of a raid by the narcotics bureau of the local police department on the convention hotel is another; and so on), and the only workable method of guarding against such an unfortunate turn of events is to exclude from the Pacificon any individual whose presence could be injurious to the convention as a whole.

Consider for a moment just what such a thorough monitoring of the attendees would entail. California is notorious for the abundance of anti-Communist lunatics in that state, and there are a number of powerful extreme right-wing groups in Southern California. Some of them possess a pipeline to the House Un-American Activities Committee. Can the reader imagine the disastrous consequences to every person who attends the Pacificon if one of these groups took an interest in the gathering of science fiction readers in their state and discovered that the affair was virtually crawling with "leftists"--and that, in fact, one member of the governing committee (Donaho) was an anarchist who had taken part in the infamous anti-HUAC demonstrations of 1960 and another (Rogers) had been a card-carrying Communist in the 1940s? No reader of this periodical is foolish enough, I trust, to believe that I am attempting to "smear" Mr. Donaho or Mr. Rogers. There is nothing whatsoever dis-

graceful in being an anarchist or an ex-Communist, and demonstrating against the HUAC is positively admirable; but the point is, these associations are no less controversial in many quarters than the matter of Walt Breen's sex life. If a troublemaker decided to make effective use of the information, the political associations (past or present) of one half of the Pacificon Committee could be just as damaging to the membership as the suspected sexual aberration of an attendee. Yet I have not received any information to indicate that Mr. Rogers is considering excluding himself from the convention in order to protect science fiction fandom as a whole.

Another bit of evidence which suggests that personal antipathy lies at the root of the Committee's actions is the rather remarkable fact that those who are most enthusiastic to play the role of moral censor are individuals who have, in the past, loudly proclaimed their liberalism. In happier days (see Shangri L'Affaires #59), Alva Rogers composed a memorable plea for sanity in conducting relationships between members of our microcosm:

"I don't see how a fan can associate amicably with another fan, enjoying his company and the product of his mind, and then--on suddenly discovering that he was at one time a Commie or is a dirty queer--turn from him and ostracize him from the Group, simply for this reason and this reason only."

Elsewhere in the same article, the gentleman who has willingly become a party to the organized campaign to ostracize Walt Breen protested:

"But, for God's sake! let's not mount ourselves on a high moral pedestal, setting ourselves as arbiters of what is acceptable and what is not acceptable to fandom; let's not start the sick, sick, sick business of looking suspiciously at all our friends and wondering if any of them were ever communists, or might be homosexuals, or might hold a low regard for the military mentality, or maybe indulges in a stick of pot occasionally."

Mr. Rogers would presumably still be willing to defend the social rights of ex-Communists, but I wonder what has caused his lofty liberalism on the question of ostracizing a suspected homosexual to evaporate? Can it be that ethical standards are abstract concepts which one finds interesting to defend in print but irrelevant to personal conduct? This most remarkable reversal deserves explanation, and I take this opportunity to invite such an explanation from Mr. Rogers.

--Ted Pauls

"'Why don't we give him a medal?' Colonel Korn proposed.

"'For going around twice? What can we give him a medal for?'

"'For going around twice,' Colonel Korn answered with a reflective, self-satisfied smile. 'After all, I suppose it did take a lot of courage to go over that target a second time with no other planes around to divert the anti-aircraft fire. And he did hit the bridge. You know, that might be the answer--to act boastfully about something we ought to be ashamed of. That's a trick that never seems to fail.'" --Joseph Heller, in "Catch-22".

"Tohuotsdeowuhbotttreamnasrlkaatbeltyhniosslyibnaesatraerwdist"n

siderable) will power necessary to quit. Psychological dependence quite commonly exists, however, with regard to drugs which are not physically addicting, such as the barbituates.

There has been a great deal of publicity lately about Synanon, an organization for the rehabilitation of drug addicts founded in Santa Monica by Charles Dederich. Addicts are put on a program of work and group therapy, in residence at a Synanon House, which has cut the relapse rate to 20% from 90% for federal hospitals. Additionally, they are rendered able to function much more efficiently. Recently, Synanon has branched out into the treatment of other sorts of character disorders with the same results.

From the above paragraph, one would gather that Synanon's work was entirely praiseworthy and constructive, and this was my opinion until I came into personal contact with the organization last Saturday evening (April 13th). I am a member of Mensa, an intellectual fraternity which admits members on the basis of their having scored in the top two percent on an IQ test. (Though I have little confidence in the tests, I find the organization generally interesting and worthwhile.) One of our members, Jeremy Ets-Hokin, is a friend of Charles Dederich, and through them it was arranged for our meeting Saturday to be held at Dederich's residence, currently the San Francisco headquarters of Synanon (which will soon open a regular Synanon House in the city).

My first impression upon arriving at Dederich's house was of immense energy and vitality in everyone about the place; these were all Synanon people, as I was the first Mensa member to arrive for the meeting. During the course of the evening, I talked with many of them and found them to be interesting and stimulating people, though with a rather puzzling unanimity in their ideas. In intelligence, I judged their average to be about the equal of that of the Mensa members present, but they were vastly more experienced and sophisticated in every way. Once, I noticed Dederich taking in a group of rather naive Mensa members with a line of nonsense, and I was rather amused, thinking it a harmless joke at their expense. Later, Jeremy Ets-Hokin suggested that Synanon might be able to help me with some of my problems. I wasn't convinced, but the group did interest me.

I had been told by several of the Synanon people, "Come around any time; call first if you can, but it isn't necessary," so, when I found myself in San Francisco with a few hours to kill Monday morning, I returned to Dederich's house and chatted for a few moments with one of the people I had talked with at the Mensa meeting. Suddenly, Dederich strode into the room, and demanded that we follow him into the large living room, in which a number of Synanon people were seated. He waved me to a seat and, before the rest of them, began to insult me. He immediately tried to make me feel uncomfortable because I had come without calling, despite the fact that I had been invited to. I mentioned that I had come to investigate Synanon further, as I had been impressed by the people I had met, and by the organization's record. He said that Synanon didn't need to be investigated by me or anyone else and that I was so neurotic that I was incapable of judging, that no one in Synanon would even talk to me except for a discussion of my entrance into the Synanon House in Santa Monica, and that such a discussion would only take place if I made an appointment to see him with my parents. I said that I had never said that I wanted to enter Synanon, and that I would certainly have to see some proof of its production of creative work before I even seriously considered it. He seemed to regard the need for

creative work as a neurosis, and consistently refused to offer any justification at all for any of his statements, and repeatedly stated that everyone in Synanon was more intelligent, productive, and well-balanced than I am. None of the others there had a word to say, except for an occasional expression of complete agreement with Dederich. I left in great disgust.

Looking back on my experience, it seems to me that Dederich is a highly charismatic individual who has succeeded in building a huge organization obedient to him by playing on the weaknesses of drug addicts and other unfortunates. From their slavish following of Dederich's line and lack of output of creative work, I gather that Synanon substitutes for drug addiction a work neurosis (similar to that found in many compulsively studying middle-class Jews who do well in school despite unexceptional intelligence), coupled with great devotion to the organization and its founder. It is not too surprising that Synanon is very successful in accomplishing this; the Black Muslims, too, have a fine record in this area. It seems that the only sure cure for drug addiction is fanaticism, but I am not convinced that the cure is better than the disease.

I've been involved in the Breen affair from the start, though I haven't seen Walter for several months due to a personal dispute--of which Walter's version appeared some time ago in Fanac. Donaho asked me to give testimony against Walter at a "hearing" to throw him out of the Pacificon II, and I refused and spilled the beans to other interested parties in the area. They organized considerable opposition at the "hearing", but Walter was expelled from the convention anyway, without any testimony being presented (according to Ray Nelson, who was there).

Gratuitous attacks on a harmless person with whom one has pledged brotherhood are bad enough, but going to the police is the ultimate in unethical conduct in a person who claimed to adhere to a moral code in which a fink is held to be utterly despicable, especially when this constitutes a betrayal of confidences. I am appalled and disgusted by the actions of Donaho and his associates, and I urge all Kipple readers to support the boycott of Pacificon II.

I'll deal with the points raised in Publicola's article with the brevity they deserve: (I) The facts here are substantially correct, but the value judgements are mistaken. The "sordid depths of our primordial urges" are far more rational guides to behavior than the needlessly complex and growth-denying laws and traditions of our society, as is shown by its inferiority--in producing happiness and freedom from internal conflict and external restrictions--to the permissive matriarchal societies of prehistory. (II) Man has no right to destroy valuable historical records, but traditions are made by men who were not afraid to destroy or materially alter earlier ones. We must be willing to do likewise. (III) This is basically correct, but the distinction between "freedom from" and "freedom to" is a silly one and purely semantic. (IV) Feeling, sensing, and wanting can be accounted for in a mechanistic universe, in which man is considered a computer, although an extremely complex one. Read "Mathematical Biology of Social Behavior", by Nicolas Rashevsky.

I was very impressed by James MacLean's letter. The esp drug whose name he forgot could be yage. I spoke with someone who had taken it a few days ago and he said that it seemed to induce telepathy. I suspect that, by releasing the inhibitions of the conscious mind, it allows one to become aware of the subconscious perception of small, also subconscious, bodily indications of mental state in another person, thus giving the illusion of direct mind-to-mind contact. I'd like to know where to obtain references on the use of drugs in esp research.

Dissatisfaction is indeed necessary for change, Ted, but one

doesn't have to be compulsive about it. When the fact that things are not exactly as an individual would have them makes him unhappy, then he is neurotic. I am not miserable because a few papers fall to the floor, but I will pick them up anyway--at least I will when I need them, or when the floor gets too cluttered up. Einstein refused to wear ties or socks because they are irrational, but your remark about him illustrates the origin of the myth that all geniuses are neurotic: people do not understand them and they tend to become very annoyed when the genius ignores their traditions. (I am no strong advocate of ties and socks, and certainly I would hesitate to call into question a man's sanity on such flimsy grounds. My point, however, was that the refusal to wear these garments constituted an eccentric trait--an assertion which is hardly debatable, since eccentricity is determined by reference to an opposing view shared by the majority, however irrational it may be.)

Frank Sheed assumes that the universe needs a reason for its existence. There is no logical or empirical justification for this view. What Marty Helgesen doesn't see is that his box cars are rolling slightly downhill--so slightly that it is imperceptible without measuring instruments--and there is no locomotive and no need for one. The box cars are simply obeying a natural, physical law.

All a system of eugenics needs to do is increase the mathematical probability of an "exceptional" child by a slight fraction--and it's not "insignificant". John Boston is right; abortion and contraception are logically equivalent. You, Ted, are saying that it's all right to stop Picasso from painting any more pictures, but it's evil to burn any that he's already done. I don't see any difference.

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